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Abstract
We study how rework routing together with wage and piece rate compensation can strengthen
incentives for quality. Traditionally, rework is assigned back to the agent who generates the
defect (in a self routing scheme) or to another agent dedicated to rework (in a dedicated routing
scheme). In contrast, a novel cross routing scheme allocates rework to a parallel agent performing
both new jobs and rework. The agent who passes quality inspection or completes rework receives
the piece rate paid per job. We compare the incentives of these rework allocation schemes in
a principal-agent model with embedded quality control and routing in a multi-class queueing
network. We show that conventional self routing of rework can never induce ﬁrst-best eﬀort.
Dedicated routing and cross routing, however, strengthen incentives for quality by imposing an
implicit punishment for quality failure. In addition, cross routing leads to workload allocation
externalities and a prisoner’s dilemma, thereby creating highest incentives for quality. Firm
proﬁtability depends on capacity levels, revenues, and quality costs. With ample capacity,
dedicated routing and cross routing both achieve ﬁrst-best proﬁt rate, while self routing does
not. With limited capacity, cross routing generates the highest proﬁt rate when appraisal,
internal failure, or external failure costs are high, while self routing performs best when gross
margins are high. When the number of agents increases, the incentive power of cross routing
reduces monotonically and approaches that of dedicated routing.
Key words: queueing networks; routing; Nash equilibrium; quality control; piece rate; epsilon
equilibrium.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper investigates how rework routing together with wage and piece rate compensation can
strengthen incentives for quality and improve ﬁrm proﬁts in a setting where agents “compete” for
rework. It is motivated by the practice of the service operations ﬁrm Memphis Auto Auction,








































































Figure 1: Three Rework Routing Schemes: (A) Self Routing, (B) Dedicated Routing, and (C) Cross Routing.
to clean and detail vehicles in parallel. The employees are paid piece rates only if their jobs pass
quality inspection while the quality control leader is paid salary plus a bonus based on overall work
quality. The ﬁrm ties compensation to quality through an unconventional rework routing scheme
i l l u s t r a t e di nF i g u r e1 Ct h a tw ec a l lcross routing. This cross routing of rework contrasts with the
two traditional practices that assign rework back to the team who generates the defect (Figure 1A)
or to a dedicated rework team (Figure 1B) and also pay piece rate only to the team whose job
passes quality inspection. We shall show that these three rework routing policies generate diﬀerent
ﬁrst-pass quality incentives and that the “competition” for rework implicit in cross routing can
yield superior outcomes.
Our main research goal is to explain how these three routing and incentive schemes compare
in terms of quality and ﬁrm proﬁts. Our analysis uses a principal-agent model with endogenous
piece rate, quality control, and routing in a multi-class queueing network. Rework routing impacts
agent incentives to exert quality-improving eﬀort in two important ways. First, self routing gives
agents a second chance to work on a job and earn the piece rate, resulting in a disincentive to exert
ﬁrst-pass eﬀort. In contrast, dedicated routing and cross routing implicitly punish the agents for
quality failure by allocating rework (and thus the associated piece rate) to another agent, thereby
boosting the incentives for ﬁrst-pass quality.
Second, whereas self routing gives each agent independent and direct control over the workload
of new jobs and rework, the workload in cross routing is determined by the equilibrium outcome of
the noncooperative eﬀort game played between the two agents. When rework takes less eﬀort than
new jobs, rework is preferred, which prompts the agents to increase their ﬁrst-pass eﬀort as a result
2of the workload allocation externality arising from the eﬀort game. To illustrate this externality,
consider the strategic interaction between the agents and the ﬂow dynamics of the queueing network.
In a capacity constrained system, both agents are continuously busy working on either new jobs or
rework. To receive more rework, agent 1 increases ﬁrst-pass eﬀort and sends less rework to agent
2. Keeping his eﬀort unchanged, agent 2 then automatically processes more new jobs and sends
more rework to agent 1. Suﬀering from reduced pay due to low rework inﬂow, however, agent 2
increases ﬁrst-pass eﬀort to counteract. Consequently both agents exert high eﬀort and receive low
rework allocation in equilibrium. This equilibrium exhibits a prisoner’s dilemma, where each agent
has an incentive to exert high eﬀort when the other agent exerts low eﬀort, even though the agents
would jointly beneﬁt from a cooperative outcome of both exerting low eﬀort (i.e., the eﬀort level
under self routing). This shows why noncooperative behavior is crucial for cross routing: when the
agents collude, it is equivalent to self routing. We loosely refer to this noncooperative behavior as
competition.
While higher ﬁrst-pass eﬀort produces fewer internal and external defects, it does not always lead
to higher proﬁts for the principal. On one hand, inducing ﬁrst-pass eﬀort beneﬁts the principal by
improving quality and reducing three of the four quality costs in Juran’s cost-of-quality framework
(Juran & Gryna (1993)): internal failure costs, external failure costs, and appraisal costs. On the
other hand, excessively high ﬁrst-pass eﬀort lowers throughput1 as the agents spend more eﬀort
(processing time) per job on average. Since piece rate compensation cost can be deemed as a form
of prevention costs, our model covers all of the four dimensions of the cost-of-quality framework.
It predicts that the principal would strive for the optimal defect rate (which has a one-to-one
relationship with the induced ﬁrst-pass eﬀort) to achieve the lowest costs by balancing the cost
of non-conformance with appraisal and prevention costs. Built on this cost minimization view of
quality management, our model adds an additional dimension: throughput and thus revenues also
impact a ﬁrm’s quality control policies.
In our model, eﬀort is the ﬁrst-pass service time chosen by the agents. Both quality and
throughput are determined by the eﬀort choices. Compared to the celebrated multitask principal-
agent model of Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991), this model embeds the intrinsic trade-oﬀ between
quantity and quality in a single dimensional decision variable. This is appropriate when the quantity
eﬀort and quality eﬀort are not separable, as displayed in Figure 2.
When service time is observable and also contractible, the moral hazard problem is eliminated.





























Figure 2: The eﬀort contractibility and separability matrix.
Indeed, in a long-run repeated setting, the principal may fully infer the average service time from
the throughput of the agent taking into account of quality loss. Though service time may be
observable, directly contracting on it can be problematic. For example, in a call center, it is
uncommon to tie agents’ compensation to their handle time per call. The diﬃculty for contracting
on handle time is two fold: behavioral issues and agent heterogeneity. First, handle time per
call is highly variable so that contracting on them would require a contract involving probability
distribution. However, statistical thinking requires mental sophistication and eﬀort, making a
probabilistic contract impractical to implement. If the call center persists on contracting on a
target handle time, agents may be misguided in terms of the “ideal” time to spend on individual
calls. Because of the challenge of statistical thinking, agents may not be able to treat the target as
an average and would try to meet the target time for every single call. According to Gans, Koole &
Mandelbaum (2003), an incentive scheme that rewards agents for maintaining low average handle
time can lead them to hang up on customers. Second, agents are heterogenous in experience and
skill levels, adding to the challenge of specifying an appropriate target handle time. Therefore,
contracting on handle time is precluded for an operationally excellent call center.
Under dedicated routing and cross routing, assigning rework to a diﬀerent agent implicitly pun-
ishes the agent for shirking. Such punishment could be replicated by a modiﬁed self routing scheme
where the principal executes a monetary punishment whenever a defect is identiﬁed. Similarly, she
could also implement a bonus that is paid whenever a job passes quality inspection in the ﬁrst pass.
Both contracts can achieve ﬁr s tb e s te ﬀort and proﬁts. However, these contracts are not the focus of
this paper. In real life, it is diﬃcult for a principal to “force” rework without or with negative pay.
4In contrast, cross routing of rework is a more “fair” contract in the sense that the principal always
pays the full piece rate per job, but only rewards the agent whose work passes quality inspection.
In a call center, cross routing has the additional beneﬁt of higher utilization of agents because
unresolved issues can be routed to any available agent rather than to the ﬁrst-contact agent.2
From a methodology perspective, restricting the principal’s contract space to wage plus piece
rate enables us to isolate the incentive eﬀects brought by the diﬀerent rework routing schemes.
The economic literatures on agency and contract theory mostly focus on incentives using purely
monetary instruments. We take those economic schemes as our benchmark and investigate whether
adding operational instruments (e.g., rework routing in our case) can achieve similar or even superior
outcomes. As such our work marries economics with operations strategy and processing network
design.
Given that quality output and inspection are imperfect, endogenous probabilistic routing of
rework is a central feature of our model. Because the agents’ actual workload allocation of new
jobs and rework is endogenously determined by their eﬀort, a natural tool to characterize the eﬀort
equilibrium arising in the ﬂow system is queueing theory. A deterministic model cannot capture
the inherent variability and ﬂow dynamics of the system. The endogeneity of rework routing also
has a second aspect: The principal compares the ﬁnancial performance of the three routing schemes
and chooses the most proﬁtable one.
Using an analytical model we establish the following results. Traditional self routing of rework
can never induce agents to exert ﬁrst-best eﬀort. Dedicated routing and cross routing, however,
oﬀer some remedy by inducing higher eﬀort and quality, which can lead to higher proﬁts for the
principal. As a result, piece rates paid in these two schemes are generally higher when holding
the wage rate constant. Firm proﬁtability depends on capacity levels, revenues, and quality costs.
With ample capacity, dedicated routing and cross routing both achieve ﬁrst-best proﬁtr a t e ,w h i l e
self routing does not. With limited capacity, cross routing generates the highest proﬁtr a t ew h e n
appraisal, internal failure, or external failure costs are high, while self routing performs best when
gross margins are high. When the number of agents increases, the incentive power of cross routing
reduces monotonically under certain conditions and approaches that of dedicated routing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature while
2We learned that at Dell Inc.’s call center for corporate IT service, a credit is awarded to agents for each customer
call that does not fail in seven days after service. Otherwise, it is routed to any agent available, who is eligible to
earn the credit.
5Section 3 lays out the main model. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the networks with ample capacity and
limited capacity, respectively. In each of the two sections, we ﬁr s td e r i v et h eﬁrst-best benchmark
and then analyze the three rework routing schemes, and ﬁnally compare their performance. Section
6 analyzes a project management setting while Section 7 concludes. In the rest of the paper, we
will use superscripts F B ,S ,D ,and C to denote solutions for ﬁrst best, self routing, dedicated
routing, and cross routing, respectively.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to three streams of literature. The ﬁrst stream is the economics literature
on compensation and job design, which studies the moral hazard problem that arises when an
agent’s eﬀort is imperfectly observed. Compensation is thus often based on output instead of eﬀort.
Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991) explain the trade-oﬀs between inducing eﬀort towards quantity vs.
quality with a multitask principal-agent model. In their model, producing high volume and good
quality is viewed as two tasks of an agent’s job. They argue that it would be costly, if not impossible,
to achieve good quality with piece rate compensation if quality were poorly measured. Instead of
taking a multitask approach, we manifest the intrinsic trade-oﬀ between quantity and quality by a
single dimensional decision variable, i.e., the average processing time spent per job. Moreover, we
provide theoretical support that smart routing of rework is capable of inducing quality-improving
eﬀort even under piece rate compensation. Lazear (2000) provides empirical evidence that piece
rate compensation signiﬁcantly improves productivity. In Lazear’s real-world example, rework is
assigned to the originating agent (i.e., self routing) and quality does not deteriorate after the ﬁrm
implements piece rate compensation. He argues that the employees have incentives to get it right
the ﬁrst time because rework is costly. In contrast, we will show that agents always exert system
suboptimal quality eﬀort under self routing.
Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991) also demonstrate that job design is an important instrument for
the control of incentives. They ﬁnd that tasks should be grouped such that easily measured tasks
are assigned to one agent and hard-to-measure tasks to the other. Though we use a one-dimensional
principal-agent model, there are two tasks in our model that diﬀer in their measurability: ﬁrst-
pass work is monitored imperfectly by quality inspection while rework is assumed to have no
uncertainty in quality. Supporting Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991)’s theory that tasks should be
separated according to their measurability characteristics, we show that dedicated routing achieves
6advantageous incentive power over self routing.
The second relevant stream of literature is on the economics of quality control and inspection in
a game-theoretic setting. These papers mostly consider quality-related contractual issues between
ﬁrms and are only tangentially related to our work. For example, Reynier & Tapiero (1995) study
the eﬀect of contract parameters and warranty costs on the choice of quality by a supplier and the
quality control policy by a buyer. Baiman, Fischer & Rajan (2000) focus on how contractibility
of quality-related information impact the product quality and proﬁts of a supplier and a buyer.
Our work studies how rework routing and costs of quality aﬀect the employees’ choice of quality-
improving eﬀort and a ﬁrm’s quality inspection policy.
From a methodological perspective, we combine the two previous literatures on principal-agent
models and quality management with that of network ﬂows in general, and queueing networks in
particular. Much of agency theory seeks contracts that maximize a principal’s objective subject to
an agent’s post-contractual opportunistic behavior. However, little is known about quality control
policies, i.e., how precisely should performance be measured? Queueing network models can cap-
ture system dynamics and quality inspection levels and allow us to draw operational insights that
are largely missing in the existing agency literature. By considering capacity-constrained systems,
we allow agents’ eﬀort levels (i.e., processing times) to directly impact system throughput, i.e.,
productivity. Similar work can be found in the literature that studies the impact of decentralized
decision making on process performance in queueing systems. Seminal work by Naor (1969) studies
how pricing can achieve social optimum and prevent performance degradation as a result of cus-
tomers’ self-interested behavior. Many followers (e.g., Mendelson & Whang (1990), Van Mieghem
(2000), Ha (2001), etc.) also design pricing mechanisms to achieve system optimal performance,
but none of these works model quality inspection and rework.
Principal-agent models in queueing systems haveb e e ne x p l o r e di nt h eo p e r a t i o n sm a n a g e m e n t
literature. A sample of recent papers include Gilbert & Weng (1998), Plambeck & Zenios (2000),
Shumsky & Pinker (2003), Gunes & Aksin (2004), Benjaafar, Elahi & Donohue (2006), Cachon &
Zhang (2006), and Ren & Zhou (2006). Plambeck & Zenios (2000) study incentives in a dynamic
setting where an agent’s eﬀort inﬂuences the transition probabilities of a system. Similarly in our
model, probabilistic routing is determined by agents’ eﬀort. But, our model captures system dy-
namics resulting from the strategic interaction between agents, which is not present in Plambeck
& Zenios (2000). Our paper is closely related to Shumsky & Pinker (2003) in that the principal
designs incentives to induce eﬀort in steady state, but diﬀers in two important ways: First, we
7explicitly model the queueing network dynamics and also consider the case where the system is
capacity constrained. Second, the principal in our model hires two agents whose expected utility
rates are interdependent. Therefore, we need to investigate agents’ strategic interactions and derive
the eﬀort Nash equilibrium. Gunes & Aksin (2004) model the interaction of market segmentation,
incentives, and process performance of a service-delivery system using a single-server queue embed-
ded in a principal-agent framework. The novelty of our model lies in that we model two endogenous
queues, i.e., the rework queues that are generated by the agents and the arrival rate of rework is
endogenously determined by the agents’ eﬀort. Ren & Zhou (2006) use a multitask principal-agent
model to study the coordination of capacity and service quality decisions in call center outsourcing.
Sharing a common theme with Gilbert & Weng (1998), Cachon & Zhang (2006), and Benjaa-
far et al. (2006), our paper uses an operational instrument to create incentives in a multi-agent
processing system. In all these papers service rate choice may be observable to the principal but
is not directly contracted upon. Rather, demand allocation schemes (in our case, rework routing
allocation schemes) are used to create competition (in our case, to induce workload allocation ex-
ternalities and thus create incentives). Multi-agent games in queueing systems can also be found in
Cachon & Harker (2002) and Parlakturk & Kumar (2004), whose models, however, do not involve
ap r i n c i p a l .
In our motivating example, Memphis Auto Auction employs teams to complete jobs. In this
paper, we will treat teams as agents and ignore the intra team incentive issues that may arise due
to free riding and collaboration. A relevant reference for team incentives is Hamilton, Nickerson &
Owan (2003), which empirically investigates the impact of teams on productivity. They distinguish
individual piece rate used in ﬂow production from group piece rate used in modular production.
They ﬁnd that group piece rate has a stronger incentive eﬀect on productivity than individual piece
rate due to collaboration among team members.
3 The Model
Operational Flows. Consider an operation where a principal hires two identical risk neutral
agents to complete work (“jobs”) and subsequently inspects their output quality. The principal
sets quality inspection precision p ∈ [0,1], which is the probability of catching a defect given a bad
output. (A good quality output passes inspection with probability 1.) This inspection precision is
observable to the agents. p can be interpreted as a sampling frequency of inspection. We assume
8that the principal commits to p once announced.
Each agent chooses ﬁrst-pass eﬀo r t( s e r v i c et i m e )t,w h e r et ≥ t and t > 0 is the minimum eﬀort
that can be exerted. The minimum eﬀort assumption prevents the extreme case where the agents
directly move jobs to quality inspection and always do rework. We assume that the agents’ service
time of each job has mean t. This strategic decision variable drives the output quality. We assume
that the agents adopt open-loop strategies and thus the service time decision is one shot.
Let F(t) denote the probability of producing good quality given ﬁrst-pass eﬀort t,w i t hF(t)=0
and F(∞)=1 . We assume that F is strictly concave and increasing (i.e., F00 < 0,F0 > 0), reﬂecting
decreasing return on eﬀort, and denote f = F0 and ¯ F =1 −F. Upon identifying defects, the principal
routes the rework either to the originating agent in self routing, to the agent dedicated to rework
in dedicated routing, or to the parallel agent in cross routing. We assume that rework always
generates good output, thus poor quality only results from not catching the ﬁrst-pass defects. The
overall quality conformance level that an external customer experiences is Q = F(t)+p ¯ F(t).
We will show that the incentive eﬀects of the three routing schemes crucially depend on whether
the network is capacitated. With ample capacity, each agent is supplied with a renewal process of
job arrivals. In steady state, the agents have idle time and the throughput is driven by exogenous
demand arrival rate. In contrast, when the system has limited capacity, the agents are continuously
busy and their eﬀort levels directly impact throughput. The motivation for looking at both cases
is that they each represent a diﬀerent real-world operating system. A system with limited capacity
models a make-to-stock system where agents are scheduled to complete jobs that are either planned
o rh a v ea r r i v e dp r e v i o u s l yi nb u l k s .I ns u c hs y s t e m s ,t h ea g e n t sa r ef u l l yu t i l i z e d( f o raﬁxed period
of time) and response time is often not a critical issue. In contrast, a system with ample capacity
models a make-to-order system where response time is critical.
For tractability, we assume that rework takes r units of time on average, where r is common
knowledge. Since defects have to be corrected as instructed by the principal, we assume that rework
eﬀort is contractible, i.e., no moral hazard problem in rework. We argue that even if agents may
exhibit opportunistic behavior in performing rework, the eﬀect is limited because identiﬁed defects
have to be corrected completely. Furthermore, rework has preemptive priority over new jobs. This
priority rule is adopted because of two considerations. First, in a capacitated system, agents can
be always engaged in new jobs. Without the priority rule, defects may never be reworked. Second,
the priority rule simpliﬁes analytics of the model. Finally, we assume that rework takes less time
9than the minimum ﬁrst-pass eﬀort:
r ≤ t. (A1)
This assumption allows us to focus on the interesting range of parameter values that highlight the
moral hazard problem and the eﬃcacy of “smart” rework routing in inducing eﬀort. We will discuss
the implications of this assumption when comparing the performance of the three routing schemes
in Section 4.3.
We assume that service times and inter-arrival times are independent and exponentially distrib-
uted. Though not considered in this paper, this assumption allows for response time evaluation.
We shall note that these assumptions can be relaxed and that a renewal process for both job arrival
a n ds e r v i c et i m e si ss u ﬃcient for all subsequent results to hold.3
Financial Flows and Incentives. Each agent earns wage rate w, and in addition piece
rate b when completing a new job that passes quality inspection or when completing a rework.
Under dedicated routing, the two agents earn diﬀerent wage rates w1 and w2. Their average is the
equivalent wage rate for comparison purpose. The agents’ disutility of eﬀo r tp e ru n i tt i m ei sa.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the agents’ reservation utility to be 0. In a competitive
labor market, a can also be interpreted as the outside wage rate. The principal earns gross margin
v per completed job that passes quality inspection, pays agents, and incurs three quality costs
classiﬁed as in Juran’s cost-of-quality framework: (1) appraisal cost per new job C(p). We assume
C(0) = C0(0) = 0 and C0(1) = ∞, which implies that in equilibrium the principal chooses an interior
inspection policy, i.e. p ∈ (0,1). In addition, C0 > 0, C00 > 0. Note that these are assumptions
often used in the quality management literature (e.g., Baiman et al. (2000)). (2) internal failure
cost per new job cI. (3) external failure cost per new job cE. (External failure costs are typically
larger than internal failure costs: cE >c I. Otherwise, the principal would have no incentives to ﬁx
defects internally.) We assume that the principal maximizes her long-run average proﬁtr a t ep e r
agent, denoted by V, while the agents maximize their long-run average utility rate, denoted by U.
4 Incentives and Routing with Ample Capacity
Ample capacity implies that the principal maintains a suﬃcient staﬃng level to complete all jobs
with appropriate response time, and that the agents have idle time in steady state. Hence, the
throughput of the system is driven by the exogenous market demand, which is represented by the
3We thank Harry Groenevelt for pointing this out.
10mean arrival rate of jobs per agent and denoted by λ. The principal focuses on reducing internal and
external failure costs through quality inspection and inducing ﬁrst-pass eﬀort while controlling for
appraisal costs and compensation costs. Let ρi denote the utilization of agent i. Throughout this
section, we assume that the system is stable in steady state. The stability condition is max
i∈{1,2}
ρi < 1.
4.1 The First-Best Benchmark (Contractible Eﬀort)
When eﬀort t is contractible, the principal’s problem is independent of whether rework is performed
by the originating agent or a diﬀerent agent. For expositional convenience, we derive the ﬁrst-best
benchmark using the self routing scheme. The agents spend on average t + p ¯ F(t)r time units
per job. Since the job arrival rate is λ per agent, renewal theory yields that the agents’ long-run
average utility rate is λ[b−a(t+p ¯ F(t)r)]−w. Though the principal hires two agents, the contracting
problem of each agent is independent and identical. The principal maximizes
V FB =m a x
0≤p≤1,t≥t,w,b
λ[v − b − ¯ F(t)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)) − C(p)] − w,
subject to λ[b − a(t + p ¯ F(t)r)] + w ≥ 0 (IR).
The individual rationality (IR) constraint speciﬁes the agents’ outside option. Note that the IR
constraint is identical for both agents. Since the principal’s proﬁt rate is monotone decreasing
in w and b, the IR constraint must bind, simplifying the principal’s problem to an optimization
problem of two variables: t and p. Let {tFB,p FB} denote the ﬁrst-best solution.4 Since ρi =
λ(tFB+p ¯ F(tFB)r), the stability condition becomes λ < 1
tFB+p ¯ F(tFB)r.5 For a stable system, Lemma
1 characterizes the ﬁrst-best solution (all proofs are relegated to the Appendix).
Lemma 1 If cE >c I + ar > a




a(pFBcI +( 1− pFB)cE)
, (1)
C0(pFB)= ¯ F(tFB)(cE − cI − ar). (2)
The optimal eﬀort depends on the density of the probability function of producing good quality.
This is because the agents face an increasing concave “production function” F(·), the density of
which measures the marginal return of eﬀort. It is simple to show that ∂2V
∂t∂p < 0, i.e., t and p are
4We ignore the issue of uniqueness of solution as all of our subsequent results hold for any interior optimum.
5Obviously, t
FB is a function of λ and F. Only for speciﬁc instances of F can this inequality be solved explicitly
in terms of model primitives.
11strategic substitutes. The principal can select from inﬁnite pairs of wage rate and piece rate to
satisfy the IR constraint at equality. Since the principal is the Stackelberg leader and the agent
earns zero utility rate in equilibrium, the principal’s objective is identical to a central planner’s.
Therefore, the ﬁrst-best solution achieves the Pareto optimum for the entire system.
4.2 Optimal Incentives for the Three Networks (Noncontractible Eﬀort)
4.2.1 Self Routing
When eﬀort t is not contractible and the rework is routed back to the originating agent, the principal
maximizes
V S =m a x
0≤p≤1,w,b
λ[v − b − ¯ F(t)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)) − C(p)] − w,
subject to λ[b − a(t + p ¯ F(t)r)] + w ≥ 0 (IR),
t ∈ argmax
t0≥ t
λ[b − a(t0 + p ¯ F(t0)r)] + w (IC).
The additional incentive compatibility (IC) constraint describes the agents’ post-contractual opti-
mization behavior. Since the two agents are completely independent and symmetric, we only need
a single IR and IC constraint.






pr) if f(t) > 1
pr
t if f(t) ≤ 1
pr
. (3)
Since the agents have suﬃcient time to complete all jobs and always earn the piece rate of
each job, the agents’ optimal eﬀort is not impacted by the job arrival rate λ and the piece rate b.
However, the ﬁrst-pass eﬀort increases when the principal raises the quality inspection precision or
when rework is costly to the agents. The stability condition becomes λ < 1
tS+p ¯ F(tS)r.
4.2.2 Dedicated Routing
Without loss of generality, we assign new jobs to agent 1 and rework to agent 2. To keep the
system’s supply of jobs unchanged, agent 1 is assigned with job arrival rate 2λ. The principal
12maximizes
V D =m a x
0≤p≤1,w,b




subject to 2λ[(1 − p ¯ F(t))b − at]+w1 ≥ 0 (IR1), 2λp ¯ F(t)(b − ar)+w2 ≥ 0 (IR2)
t ∈ argmax
t0≥t
2λ[(1 − p ¯ F(t0))b − at0]+w1 (IC1).
Since agent 2’s rework eﬀort is contractible, only IC1 is needed.






pb) if f(t) > a
pb
t if f(t) ≤ a
pb
.
Now agent 1’s optimal eﬀort depends on both p and b. Therefore, the principal can induce
higher ﬁrst-pass eﬀort not only by increasing the quality inspection precision but also by raising
the piece rate. Agent 1 and 2’s utilizations are ρ1 =2 λtD and ρ2 =2 λp ¯ F(tD)r, respectively. The
stability condition becomes λ < min{ 1
2tD, 1
2p ¯ F(tD)r} = 1
2tD.
4.2.3 Cross Routing
When rework is assigned to the parallel agent, a rework queue is generated and its queue size
depends on the ﬁrst-pass eﬀort of the originating agent. We now must characterize the rework
equilibrium queues as part of the principal-agent incentive problem. For the multi-class queueing
network illustrated in Figure 1C, we deﬁne the following rates for i,j ∈ {1,2} and i 6= j:
• Agent i0s new job service rate µn
i = 1
ti
• Agent i0s defect generation rate (or agent j0s rework arrival rate) λij =
p ¯ F(ti)
ti
• Rework service rate µr = 1
r (same for both agents)
Let a four-dimensional vector (Z1,Z 2,Z 3,Z 4) represent the state of the four queues of the system
(two new job queues and two rework queues). The detailed balance equations are too complex to
be solved analytically in closed form. However, we do not need the limiting distribution of every
single state to compute the utility rate of the agents. It suﬃces to know the aggregate probabilities
of the agents being idle π0
i, working on new jobs πn
i ,a n dw o r k i n go nr e w o r kπr
i. In steady state,




i =1 (Law of total probability),
λ = µn
i πn
i (Balance of agent i0s new job queue),
λjiπn
j = µrπr
i (Balance of agent i0s rework queue),
for i,j ∈ {1,2} and i 6= j. Solving the above equations yields
π0
i =1− λti − λp ¯ F(tj)r, πn
i = λti, πr
i = λp ¯ F(tj)r
Thus, agent i0s long-run average utility rate
Ui(ti,t j)=πn
i ×







= λ[(1 − p ¯ F(ti))b − ati]+λp ¯ F(tj)(b − ar)+w.
Notice that the ﬁrst term is agent i’s average reward rate from working on new jobs while the
second term is his average reward rate from completing rework generated by agent j.
Lemma 4 With ample capacity and cross routing, the unique Nash equilibrium of the agents’ eﬀort
game is (tC,t C),w h e r etC = tD as in Lemma 3.
Surprisingly, the agents’ optimal eﬀort in equilibrium is independent of each other’s eﬀort and is
solely determined by the principal’s quality inspection and incentive decisions. Because the agents
have idle time in steady state, performing rework simply reduces idle time, but does not impact their
workload of new jobs. Therefore, cross routing imposes no additional eﬀect on the incentives other
than taking away the second opportunity to work on a job. This eﬀect is also present in dedicated
routing, rendering identical optimal eﬀort in both schemes. Moreover, the two agents have no
strategic interactions and behave symmetrically. Since agent i’s utilization ρi = λ(ti + p ¯ F(tj)r),
the stability condition becomes λ < 1
tC+p ¯ F(tC)r. The principal maximizes
V C =m a x
0≤p≤1,w,b
λ[v − b − ¯ F(t)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)) − C(p)] − w,
subject to λ[(1 − p ¯ F(t))b − at]+w ≥ 0 (IR),
t = tC (IC).
4.3 Comparing the Three Networks: Implicit Punishment
Comparing Equation (1) with (3) allows us to illustrate the importance of assumption (A1). Notice
that when r is large, the diﬀerence between f(tFB) and f(tS) becomes small and thus even self
14routing performs close to ﬁrst best. This supports the intuition that agents have incentives to get
it right the ﬁrst time when rework is costly. Therefore, assumption (A1) allows us to restrict our
attention to the range of parameter values where agents’ opportunistic behavior is prominent. In
addition, small rework time makes self routing and cross routing implementable in a ﬂow system.
Otherwise, the production line has to be stopped to allow agents to complete rework backlog. The
opposite extreme of the assumption is that r is suﬃciently large such that ar > cE − cI. Then,
it is optimal for the principal to eliminate quality inspection (or to scrap the defects) because the
reduction in external failure costs cannot compensate for the high costs of internal repair.
Proposition 1 Self routing can never implement ﬁrst best. In contrast, dedicated routing imple-
ments ﬁr s tb e s tw i t hc o n t r a c t{pFB,w∗
1,w∗
2,b ∗} and cross routing implements ﬁr s tb e s tw i t hc o n -
tract {pFB,w∗,b ∗},w h e r eb∗ = ar + cI +
1−pFB
pFB cE,w ∗
1 =2 λ[atFB − (1 − pFB¯ F(tFB))b∗],w ∗
2 =
2λpFB¯ F(tFB)(ar−b∗), and w∗ = λ[a(tFB+pFB¯ F(tFB)r)−b∗]. Therefore, V FB = V D = V C >VS.
Proposition 1 reﬂects the weakness of the conventional self routing scheme: Because the agent
has a second chance to work on a job and earn the piece rate, he has a disincentive to exert ﬁrst-pass
eﬀort and takes his chance at quality inspection. This gaming behavior leads to a lower ﬁrst-pass
quality level, incurring higher internal and external failure costs to the principal. In contrast, both
dedicated routing and cross routing can attain ﬁrst best. The optimal piece rate b∗ is chosen to
induce the ﬁrst-best eﬀort while the wage rates are chosen to meet the agents’ reservation utility




2 i.e., the wage rate paid under cross routing equals the average
wage rate paid under dedicated routing.
From a central planner’s point of view, dedicated routing and cross routing are superior because
the eﬀort and quality inspection are set at the system optimal level. Because the agents earn their
reservation utility rate under the ﬁrst-best contracts, the principal achieves the highest possible
proﬁt rate under these two routing schemes. We further compare the three schemes along ﬁrst-pass
eﬀort, quality output, and piece rate. We will use y(p) to denote a function of p.
Corollary 1 For all p ∈ (0,1),t FB(p)=tD(p)=tC(p) >t S(p). Therefore, QFB(p)=QD(p)=
QS(p) >Q S(p).
Dedicated routing and cross routing provide stronger incentives for quality because assigning
rework to a diﬀerent agent imposes an implicit punishment on the agents for their quality failure.
This punishment is derived from that the agents lose the eﬀort spent on the jobs that fail quality












proﬁtr a t eV
Self Low Low Low Low Low Depends on
Dedicated High High High Medium Medium quality costs and
Cross High High High High High gross margins
Table 1: Comparing ﬁrst-pass eﬀort, piece rates, and proﬁt rates of the three schemes.
inspection. Since the piece rate is paid on top of the wage rate, it can be viewed more generally as
ab o n u ss y s t e m :
BonusS = piece rate × inﬂow,
BonusD = piece rate × (inﬂow − rework sent to others),
BonusC = piece rate × (inﬂow + rework received from others − rework sent to others).
The implicit punishment is monetary and is evident from the deduction of bonus under dedicated
routing and cross routing.
Corollary 2 For all p ∈ (0,1),b FB(p)=bD(p)=bC(p) >b S(p) at equal wage rates.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the piece rates paid in cross routing and dedicated routing are higher
than the one paid in self routing because in the former two schemes the agents exert higher eﬀort
in equilibrium and cannot recoup the cost of eﬀort spent on the jobs that have failed inspection. A
summary of the comparison is in Table 1.
4.4 Equilibria with Many Agents
So far we have only considered an operation with two agents. It is interesting to see whether the
results hold in a large operation with many agents. Let N ∈ N denote the number of agents. With
self routing, the system can be scaled up proportionally because the agents are independent of each
other. With dedicated routing and cross routing, however, we need to make further assumptions
on how the system is scaled up and what the routing rule is. For dedicated routing, we treat each
pair of agents as the basic unit and an N-agent system has N/2 such units (restrict N to even
numbers). Obviously, the N-agent system is identical to the two-agent system in terms of proﬁt
16rate. For cross routing, we treat the agents anonymous and route rework to each one with equal
probability. The long run utility rate of agent i is






It follows immediately that tC
i = f−1( a
pb), which is identical to that of the two-agent case. In
summary, when the system has ample capacity, the system can be scaled up proportionally and the
incentive eﬀects of the three routing schemes remain unchanged.
5 Incentives and Routing with Limited Capacity
In contrast to the ample capacity case, the throughput of a capacitated system is endogenous and
depends on the agents’ eﬀort. Therefore, both the agents and the principal face a trade-oﬀ between
throughput and quality. Optimizing their utility rate, the agents balance the time allocated to new
jobs versus rework to trade-oﬀ earning the piece rate from ﬁrst-pass success with that from rework.
The principal balances inducing quality-improving eﬀort with increasing throughput. Throughout
this section, we assume that the arrival rate of new jobs are suﬃciently large such that the stability
conditions of the previous section cannot be satisﬁed. Though rework queues are considered, their
stability conditions are automatically satisﬁed because rework arrival rate p ¯ F(ti)/ti is smaller than
rework service rate 1/r.
5.1 The First-Best Benchmark (Contractible Eﬀort)
When working at capacity, the agents are continuously busy6 and spend t+p ¯ F(t)r time units per job
on average. In contrast to λ earlier, the average throughput per agent now becomes 1/(t+p ¯ F(t)r).
Renewal theory yields that the agents’ long-run average utility rate is b/(t+p ¯ F(t)r)+w−a. When
eﬀort t is contractible, the principal maximizes
V FB =m a x
t≥t,0≤p≤1,w,b
v − b − ¯ F(t)(pcI +( 1− p)cE) − C(p)




t + p ¯ F(t)r
+ w − a ≥ 0 (IR).
Since the proﬁt rate is monotone decreasing in w and b, the IR constraint must bind and the
optimization problem reduces to a two-variable problem of t and p.
6The rework agent in dedicated routing has idle time in steady state.




A(tFB,pFB)(pFBcI +( 1− pFB)cE)
, (4)
C0(pFB)= ¯ F(tFB)(cE − cI − A(tFB,p FB)r), (5)
where A(tFB,p FB)=
v− ¯ F(tFB)(pFBcI+(1−pFB)cE)−C(pFB)
tFB+pFB ¯ F(tFB)r .
Notice that the ﬁrst-order conditions resemble Equations (1) and (2). The only diﬀerence is
that the disutility of eﬀort a is replaced with A(tFB,p FB).
5.2 Optimal Incentives for the Three Networks (Noncontractible Eﬀort)
5.2.1 Self Routing
When eﬀort t is not contractible, the principal maximizes
V S =m a x
0≤p≤1,w,b
v − b − ¯ F(t)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)) − C(p)




t + p ¯ F(t)r





t0 + p ¯ F(t0)r
+ w − a} (IC).
It turns out that the agents have the same optimal response as in the ample capacity case, i.e., tS
is given by equation (3). In both cases, the agents maximize their average payoﬀ by minimizing
the total expected time spent per job:
tS =a r gm i n
t0≥t
{t0 + p ¯ F(t0)r}
Doing so is optimal for the agents because the piece rate of each job is guaranteed given the
opportunity of rework. Consequently, the agents’ optimal eﬀort only depends on the inspection
precision p and the slope of F, thus independent of whether the agents are continuously busy or
have idle time. The following lemma states the result.
Lemma 6 With limited capacity and self routing, the agents’ unique optimal eﬀort is tS as in
Lemma 2.
185.2.2 Dedicated Routing
Without loss of generality, we assign new jobs to agent 1 and rework to agent 2. The principal
maximizes









(1 − p ¯ F(t1))b
t1
+ w1 − a ≥ 0 (IR1),
p ¯ F(t1)
t1




(1 − p ¯ F(t0))b
t0 + w1 − a} (IC1).







ptD ) if tf(t) > 1
p − 1
t if tf(t) ≤ 1
p − 1
.
Diﬀerent from the ample capacity case, agent 1’s optimal eﬀort does not depend on b. Since
agent 1 is continuously busy in the capacitated system, he does not face the trade-oﬀ between
making money and having idle time. He only cares about the expected time spent per piece rate
earned, and thus his successful throughput, which is given by (1 − p ¯ F(t))/t.
5.2.3 Cross Routing
Unlike in the case of ample capacity, we only need to consider the queueing dynamics of the two
rework queues (because the new job queues are non-empty w.p. 1 when the system is capacitated).
The state of the queueing network is described by (Z3,Z 4), where Zi+2 is the rework queue size for
agent i. Figure 3C illustrates the state transitions of this multi-class queueing network. In steady
state, Z3Z4 =0because the states where both rework queues are nonempty are transient. Though
we could have solved the limiting distribution for each possible state of (Z3,Z 4) using the detailed
balance equation approach, we only need the aggregate probabilities of the agents working on new
jobs πn
i and on rework πr
i. In steady state, the queueing network must satisfy
πn
i + πr
i =1 (Law of total probability),
λjiπn
j = µrπr
i (Balance of agent i0s rework queue),
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Figure 3: State Transition Diagrams of a Capacity Constrained Queueing System under the Three Rework
Routing Schemes
where ρi(ti)=p ¯ F(ti) r











Lemma 8 With limited capacity and cross routing, if an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium
(tC
i ,t C
j ) with tC
i = tC
j = tC e x i s t s ,i tm u s ts a t i s f y
p[tCf(tC)+ ¯ F(tC)][ρ(tC)(1 −
r
tC)+1 ]+ρ(tC)2 − 1=0 .
Similar to dedicated routing, the equilibrium eﬀort only depends on p. B e c a u s ew ef o c u so n
symmetric Nash equilibrium, we safely suppress the subscripts distinguishing the agents. The
principal’s problem becomes
V C =m a x
0≤p≤1,w,b
v − b + ¯ F(t)(pcI +( 1− p)cE) − C(p)




t + p ¯ F(t)r
+ w − a ≥ 0 (IR),
t = tC (IC).
5.3 Comparing the Three Networks: Externality and Prisoner’s Dilemma
In Section 4, we have shown that dedicated routing and cross routing impose an implicit punishment
for quality failure. Here, we will highlight an additional incentive eﬀect of cross routing: workload
allocation externalities and a resulting prisoner’s dilemma.
20Proposition 2 The ﬁrst-best solution {pFB,t FB} can never be achieved by the three rework routing
schemes. Furthermore, tS(p) <t FB(p) for all p ∈ (0,1).
The conventional self routing scheme induces lower eﬀort than the ﬁrst-best situation at any
inspection precision p. As a result, self routing can never achieve ﬁrst best. Dedicated routing and
cross routing cannot attain ﬁrst best either. Next we compare the performance of the three routing
schemes in terms of eﬀort, quality, and proﬁt rate.
Lemma 9 For all p ∈ (0,1),t C(p) >t D(p) >t S(p) and therefore, QC(p) >Q D(p) >Q S(p).
Similar to the ample capacity case, self routing induces the least eﬀort. In contrast, cross
routing induces even higher eﬀort than dedicated routing. Under cross routing, the two parallel
agents impact each other in two ways: they both generate and perform rework for each other. Since
rework is favorable, each agent would like the other one to send him more rework. Because rework
has priority, agent i has an incentive to pass less rework to agent j so that agent j has more time
to work on new jobs and pass more rework back to agent i.
Externality. The strategic interaction in the eﬀort game results in workload allocation exter-
nalities between the agents. Whenever agent i increases eﬀort, he not only improves his ﬁrst-pass
success probability, but also forces agent j to spend more time on new jobs and thus generate more




















j/∂ti > 0 illustrates the workload externality imposed on agent j when agent i increases his ﬁrst-
pass eﬀort. Since πr
i is the fraction of time agent i spends on rework in steady state, ∂πr
i/∂ti > 0
implies that agent i has more rework allocation when he increases his ﬁrst-pass eﬀort. For the
same reason, agent j increases his ﬁrst-pass eﬀort to respond to agent i0s action. In the eﬀort Nash
equilibrium, both agents exert higher ﬁrst-pass eﬀort than under dedicated routing, resulting in
better ﬁrst-pass quality. Therefore, the workload allocation externalities in the eﬀort game give
cross routing superiority in inducing quality-improving eﬀort.
Lemma 10 For all p ∈ (0,1) and at equal wage rate,
(i) bC(p) >b S(p);
( i i )W h e nt h ew a g er a t ei sz e r o ,bC(p) >b D(p) >b S(p).
21Lemma 10 states that the principal pays a higher piece rate to compensate for the higher eﬀort
that agents exert under cross routing and dedicated routing. More interestingly, using this piece
rate ranking, we can show that the eﬀort equilibrium of cross routing exhibits a prisoner’s dilemma.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Notice that cooperative agents would exert tS because it minimizes
the total expected time spent on each job. This cooperative outcome gives agents strictly positive
utility rate because bC(p) >b S(p), thus a better outcome for both agents than the equilibrium








(1 + ρ(tS))(ρ(tS)(1 −
r
tS)+1 )+ρ(tS)2 − 1] > 0.
The last inequality follows from that ρ(tS) < 1 and r ≤ tS. Therefore, agent i has an incentive
to unilaterally deviate from the cooperative outcome. (Section 6.1 elaborates on this strategic
behavior and discusses incentives for collusion.) This prisoner’s dilemma works in favor of the
principal because it induces higher ﬁrst-pass eﬀort and thus leads to higher quality output. We
now compare the principal’s proﬁtr a t e .
Proposition 3 V FB > max{V S,VD,VC}. The rank order of the principal’s proﬁt rate depends
on the quality costs and the gross margin:
(i) if cI, cE are suﬃciently large or C(·) is suﬃciently convex, V C >VD >VS.
(ii) if v is suﬃciently large, V S > max{V D,VC}.
Being capacity constrained, the principal must take into account the impact of the agents’ eﬀort
on throughput. If she earns a high gross margin per job, the principal has less incentive to induce
eﬀo r tb e c a u s eh i g h e re ﬀort than tS leads to lower throughput and consequently lowers the revenue
rate. Therefore, cross routing underperforms self routing when v is suﬃciently large. However,
when the costs of quality are high, it becomes critical for the principal to improve ﬁrst-pass quality,
making cross routing preferable to self routing.
We illustrate these eﬀects by numerical examples. When the gross margin is high (Figure
4), there exists a threshold of cA (cA indicates how convex C(·) is), below which self routing
generates the highest proﬁt rate. In contrast, when the gross margin is low (Figure 5), cross
routing always dominates the other two schemes. There exists another threshold of cA,a b o v e
which V C >VD >VS. These results are consistent with Proposition 3.
22A: Effort  t B: Quality Inspection Precision p
C: Piece Rate b D: Profit Rate V
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Figure 4: Financial performance depends on the appraisal cost: high gross margin (v = 10).F (t)=
1 − e−3(t−1),c I =0 .5,c E =1 0 ,C (p)=
cAp2
1−p ,a=0 .5,r=0 .5,w=0 .
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Figure 5: Financial performance depends on the appraisal cost: low gross margin (v =4 ) .F (t)=
1 − e−3(t−1),c I =0 .5,c E =1 0 ,C (p)=
cAp2
1−p ,a=0 .5,r=0 .5,w=0 .
235.4 Equilibria with Many Agents
Similar to the case of ample capacity, the system scales up proportionally under self routing and
dedicated routing and thus their incentive eﬀects remain unchanged. In contrast, we will show that
the incentive eﬀects of cross routing reduce in an interesting way. Under cross routing, agent i’s





















 + w − a,
where t−i denote the vector (t1,...,t i−1,t i+1,...,t N).
Lemma 11 With limited capacity and cross routing, if an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium





















This result generalizes the equilibrium condition of Lemma 8 to the case of N-agent.
Lemma 12 For any N ≥ 2 and p ∈ (0,1),t C
N(p) >t D(p), where tD(p) is the optimal eﬀort under
dedicated routing as in Lemma 7.
This lemma shows that the incentive power of cross routing is still higher than that of dedicated
routing in a system with many agents. However, as the system grows larger, each agent’s impact on
any other speciﬁc agent diminishes. In fact, under a mild condition on the probability function F(·),
we further establish a monotonicity property that the incentive power of cross routing decreases
in the size of the system. The condition is often used in the supply chain contracting literature:
increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR). Lariviere & Porteus (2001) deﬁne the generalized failure
rate of a distribution function Φ as ξφ(ξ)/¯ Φ(ξ), where φ is the density of Φ and ¯ Φ =1− Φ. IGFR
means that ξφ(ξ)/¯ Φ(ξ) is weakly increasing for all ξ such that Φ(ξ) < 1. We also need the decreasing
failure rate (DFR) property, i.e., φ(ξ)/¯ Φ(ξ) is weakly decreasing for all ξ such that Φ(ξ) < 1.
Lemma 13 (Monotonicity). Assume that F(·) satisﬁes IGFR and DFR, and that tf(t) ≥ 1.
For any N ≥ 2,t C
N is monotone decreasing in N.
The conditions are suﬃcient but not necessary for the monotonicity property to hold. A canon-
ical example is of the exponential form: F(t)=1− βe−(t−t). Because it has constant failure rate,
24it satisﬁes both IGFR and DFR. Moreover, as long as t ≥ 1/β,t f(t) ≥ 1 is satisﬁed. Though
increasing failure rate ( I F R )i m p l i e sI G F R ,t h er e v e r s ei sn o tt r u e ,t h u sm a k i n gi tp o s s i b l ef o ra
distribution function to be both IGFR and DFR. In fact many DFR distribution functions are
IGFR (Lariviere (2006)).
Notice that if we take N to the limit, the equilibrium condition reduces to f(t)=
1−p ¯ F(t)
pt , the
solution of which is exactly tD. This suggests that in the limit game, there may exist a symmetric
equilibrium in which all agents play tD. In the literature of large games, the limit of a sequence
of ﬁnite games where the number of players increases to inﬁnity can be studied as a game with
continuous players in a rigorous mathematical sense (Green (1986)) or characterized using the
concept of ε-equilibrium, which we adopt here.
Deﬁnition 1 (ε-equilibrium). Let ε ≥ 0. If ˆ t ∈ RN
+ is an ε-equilibrium, there exists no agent i
and no ti ∈ [t,∞) such that Ui(ti,ˆ t−i) − Ui(ˆ ti,ˆ t−i) > ε.
Notice that ε-equilibrium is a weakened notion of Nash equilibrium. If ε =0 , the deﬁnition
reduces to that of Nash equilibrium. In words, ε-equilibrium describes the strategy proﬁle that is
within ε of the best payoﬀ of each agent. An immediate question is why the agents would contend
with something less than optimal? One interpretation of ε is that it represents the adjustment cost
of discovering and using the optimal strategy (Radner (1979)). Another interpretation is bounded
rationality of individual agents.
Proposition 4 Let ε ≥ 0. There is an Nε such that, for all N ≥ Nε, there exists an ε-equilibrium
i nw h i c he a c ha g e n tc h o o s e stD as in Lemma 7.
This proposition states that in a cross routing system with many agents, it is an approximate
equilibrium for all agents to behave as if rework were routed to a dedicated agent. This result
is intuitive and consistent with the ﬁndings with two agents. Earlier we have shown that cross
routing has higher incentives than dedicated routing because both agents can inﬂuence each other’s
workload of new jobs and rework in a substantial way. As the number of agents increases, the
inﬂuence of each agent vanishes, which is typical of an anonymous large game. The strategic
interactions thus diminish to none and the incentive power of cross routing reduces to implicit
punishment, making it close to dedicated routing. The diminishing incentive power of cross routing
in large systems suggests that it may be preferred for the principal to match agents into cross-
routing pairs to preserve the incentives for quality.
256 Project Management Setting: Static System
Until now, we have focused on a continuous ﬂow system where jobs are constantly assigned to
agents. To check whether the strategic eﬀects illustrated earlier extend to a static system, we now
consider a project environment where a single job (i.e., project) is assigned to an agent who needs to
complete it within certain period of time. This static setting also allows for a clear demonstration of
the prisoner’s dilemma arising from the eﬀort game under cross routing. It is reasonable to assume
that the agents maximize their utility per job in this context. For analytical purposes, we assume
that there are only two possible eﬀort levels {tH,t L}. With eﬀort levels tH and tL, good quality
output is produced with probabilities πH and πL, respectively. We assume 0 < πL < πH < 1.
As in the main model, rework takes a constant eﬀort r, which is contractible. Further, rework is
relatively less costly, speciﬁcally, r<t L. Here we can allow a more general disutility7 of eﬀort g(t),
with g(0) = 0,g 0 > 0 and g00 > 0. Further more, we assume that it is optimal for the principal to
induce high eﬀort. This is the more interesting case as quality is crucial to the principal.
6.1 Self Routing
Under self routing, agent i’s utility depends on his eﬀort:
UH = b − g(tH) − p(1 − πH)g(r)+w, UL = b − g(tL) − p(1 − πL)g(r)+w.
The IC constraint for inducing high eﬀort is UH ≥ UL. Equivalently,




To ensure high eﬀort is implementable using the self routing scheme, we need ¯ pS < 1 and thus
assume g(r) >
g(tH)−g(tL)
πH−πL . This is the more interesting case because self routing would otherwise
be immediately inferior. Since the throughput is limited to one unit, the principal’s problem
becomes minimizing the total cost per agent:
CS =m i n
0≤p≤1,w,b
b +( 1− πH)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)+C(p)+w
subject to b − g(tH) − p(1 − πH)g(r)+w ≥ 0 (IR), p ≥ ¯ pS (IC).
7In our main model, a linear disutility of eﬀort is assumed because long-run analysis of the agents’ utility rate
requires additivity of disutility.
266.2 Dedicated Routing
To keep dedicated routing equivalent to the other two schemes, assign two projects to agent 1.
Agent 1’s utility depends on his eﬀort:
UH =2 [ ( 1− p(1 − πH))b − g(tH)] + w1,U L =2 [ ( 1− p(1 − πL))b − g(tL)] + w2.
The IC constraint for inducing high eﬀort is UH ≥ UL. Equivalently,




The principal’s problem becomes
CD =m i n
0≤p≤1,w1,w2,b
b +( 1− πH)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)+C(p)+
w1 + w2
2
subject to 2[ (1 − p(1 − πH))b − g(tH)] + w1 ≥ 0 (IR1), p ≥ ¯ pD (IC1),
2p(1 − πH)(b − g(r)) + w2 ≥ 0 (IR2).
Since ¯ pD depends on b, high eﬀort is always implementable as long as the piece rate b is set high
enough. Similar to the ample capacity case of the main model, dedicated routing gives the principal
an additional lever, i.e., b, to induce eﬀort.
6.3 Cross Routing
Under cross routing, agent i’s utility also depends on agent j0se ﬀort:
UHH = b − g(tH) − p(1 − πH)g(r)+w, ULH =( 1− p(πH − πL))b − g(tL) − p(1 − πH)g(r)+w,
ULL = b − g(tL) − p(1 − πL)g(r)+w, UHL =( 1+p(πH − πL))b − g(tH) − p(1 − πL)g(r)+w,
where the ﬁrst and second subscripts denote agent i’s and j’s eﬀort level, respectively. The IC
constraint for inducing {H,H} equilibrium outcome is UHH ≥ ULH. Equivalently,
p ≥ ¯ pC =
g(tH) − g(tL)
(πH − πL)b
Similar to dedicated routing, high eﬀort is always implementable as long as the piece rate b is set
high enough. The principal’s problem becomes
CC =m i n
0≤p≤1,w,b
b +( 1− πH)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)+C(p)+w
subject to b − g(tH) − p(1 − πH)g(r)+w ≥ 0 (IR), p ≥ ¯ pC (IC).
276.4 Comparing the Three Schemes: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Collusion
We ﬁrst compare the lower bound on the quality inspection precision required to achieve high eﬀort.
It is simple to show that ¯ pC =¯ pD but ¯ pS can be higher or lower. The equality between ¯ pC and ¯ pD
implies that cross assignment of rework and assigning rework to a dedicated agent have equivalent
incentive eﬀects. When ¯ pC ≥ ¯ pS, self routing achieves identical performance as cross routing. By
contrast, when ¯ pC < ¯ pS, the Nash equilibrium induced between the two agents in cross routing
exhibits a prisoner’s dilemma for any p ∈ (¯ pC, ¯ pS). This follows from
UHL − ULL = p(πH − πL)b − g(tH)+g(tL) > 0
UHH − ULL = g(tL) − g(tH)+pg(r)(πH − πL) < 0
In other words, even though strategy proﬁle (tL,t L) gives both agents a higher payoﬀ than the
equilibrium payoﬀ, agents will make unilateral deviation to high eﬀort, resulting in a prisoner’s
dilemma. When this occurs, cross routing leads to lower costs to the principal. The next proposition
states the conditions when this would occur.
Proposition 5 CS ≥ CD = CC. The inequality is strict when cI is suﬃciently large, when cE is
suﬃciently small, or when C(·) is suﬃciently convex.
The above results are consistent with Propositions 1 in that self routing is weakly dominated by
the other two schemes. However, it diﬀers from Proposition 3 in that cI and cE play diﬀerent roles
in determining the rank order. These diﬀerences result from that high eﬀort is always assumed to
be desirable in the current model, while the principal is allowed to choose optimal eﬀort earlier.
Finally, we caution that the superior performance of cross routing relies on the restriction that
the agents do not have future interactions. According to the Nash Reversion Folk Theorem (see
Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green (1995)), a collusive outcome (tL,t L) can be supported with Nash
reversion strategies and a suﬃciently large discount factor in a repeated game. This suggests that
in practice, it may be beneﬁcial for the principal to maintain a certain level of staﬀ turnover to
prevent collusion.
7 Conclusions and Discussions
This paper investigates how incentives and judicious rework routing can improve quality and prof-
itability of a ﬁrm using a principal-agent model integrated into a multi-class queueing network.
28We demonstrate that conventional self routing of rework is always suboptimal in terms of induc-
ing quality-improving eﬀort. In contrast, dedicated routing and cross routing perform better in
inducing eﬀort. However, ﬁnancial performance depends not only on the ﬁrst-pass eﬀort induced,
but also on capacity levels, revenues, and quality costs. The more novel cross routing scheme is
applicable in both manufacturing and service operations environment. The merit of this scheme lies
in that the agents inﬂuence each other’s workload allocation of new jobs and rework in a way that
leads to higher equilibrium ﬁrst-pass eﬀort as a result of a prisoner’s dilemma. This works in favor
of the principal when quality is important, i.e., when quality costs are high. When the number of
agents increases, the incentive power of cross routing reduces monotonically and approaches that
of dedicated routing. We have also considered the eﬀect of non-constant rework time by assuming
r = τ −t, where τ is a constant. The results are consistent with our main ﬁndings (see our Online
Appendix for details).
We have made two methodological contributions to the agency and operations management
literature. First, we study a multi-agent principal-agent model in a multi-class queueing network
with endogenous queues (recall the job arrival rate of the rework queues is endogenously determined
by the agents’ ﬁrst-pass eﬀort). To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁr s ta t t e m p ta tm o d e l i n g
endogenous queueing dynamics in a principal-agent framework. Second, we embed the quantity-
quality trade-oﬀ in a single dimensional decision variable, i.e., the average processing time per job.
This is more appropriate than the multitask principal-agent model when quantity and quality are
not separable tasks of an agent’s job.
We have illustrated how rework routing aﬀects incentives in a speciﬁc queueing network formu-
lated here. The insights of this paper will ﬁnd applications in a broader network setting where a
principal uses routing as an operational instrument to create incentives complementing the eﬀects
of monetary incentives. In essence, the decentralized decision making of individual agents in a
queueing network creates externalities between the agents that may work in favor of the principal.
Our model has limitations. First, due to the inherent variability in queueing networks, risk
aversion cannot be easily incorporated given that we conduct long-run analysis. Second, we assume
that agents commit to a single ﬁrst-pass eﬀort level even though in reality they can adjust eﬀort from
time to time and thus play a dynamic game. Third, our model does not capture customer waiting
costs and inventory holding costs, though they can be incorporated. When customer waiting costs
are considered, pricing of the goods or services sold by the principal will depend on the agents’
eﬀort. Customer waiting also aﬀects the principal’s decision on capacity, i.e., whether to acquire
29adequate staﬃng to provide good service or maintain high utilization of resources to minimize
cost. Inventory holding costs can be incorporated straightforwardly. We believe this will change
our result in one direction: the principal will have less incentives to induce eﬀo r tb e c a u s eh i g h e r
ﬁrst-pass eﬀort leads to longer ﬂow time, and thus higher inventory holding costs. Finally, our
model does not cover a few important aspects of manufacturing and service operations. From the
perspective of lean operations, self routing enables quality at the source and allows the workers to
learn from their own mistakes. Since the utilization of agents is not balanced in dedicated routing,
cross routing may be preferred even though the two routing schemes have the same incentive eﬀects.
However, cross routing loses the specialization beneﬁt of dedicated routing.
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Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Notice that when t ≥ v
a, V< 0. Therefore, we maximize a continuous function
over a compact set: [t, v
a] × [0,1], implying an optimum exists. C0(1) = ∞ implies pFB < 1. Since the IR




= λ[−a + f(tFB)(pFB(ar + cI)+( 1− pFB)cE)] ≤ 0,
∂V (tFB,p FB)
∂p
= λ[ ¯ F(tFB)(cE − cI − ar) − C0(pFB)] ≤ 0.
C0(0) = 0 implies pFB > 0 because cE − cI >a rgives
∂V (t,0)
∂p > 0.p FB ∈ (0,1) implies (pFB(ar +
cI)+( 1− pFB)cE) ∈ (ar + cI,c E). When a
f(t) <a r+ cI,
∂V (t,p)
∂t > 0 implying t>t . ¥
PROOF OF LEMMA 2, 3, 4. The Kuhn-Tucker condition is −1+prf(t) ≤ 0 with equality at interior
solutions. The boundary conditions follows from that f is strictly monotone decreasing. The uniqueness
follows from the second-order condition (SOC) λaprF00(t) < 0. P r o o f so fL e m m a3a n d4a r es i m i l a ra n d
thus omitted. ¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. From equation 1, f(tS) >f (tFB), implying tS <t FB, therefore self
routing cannot achieve ﬁrst best. Since tD = tC = f−1( a
bp), set p = pFB and b∗ = a
f(tFB)p to induce tFB.
The rest follows from that the IR constraints are satisﬁed at equality. ¥
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. From equation 1, f(tS) >f (tFB), implying tS(p) <t FB(p)=tD(p)=
tC(p). The rest follows from that Q is strictly increasing in t at any p. ¥
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Because tS =a r gm i n
t0≥t
{t0+p ¯ F(t0)r},w FB(p)=λ[a(tFB(p)+p ¯ F(tFB(p))r)−
bFB(p)] = wS(p)=λ[a(tS(p)+p ¯ F(tS(p))r)−bS(p)] implies that bFB(p) >b S(p). The rest follows from
bFB(p)=bD(p)=bC(p).¥
PROOF OF LEMMA 5. Notice that when t ≥ v
a, V< 0. Therefore, we maximize a continuous function
over a compact set: [t, v
a] × [0,1], implying an optimum exists. Assuming an interior optimum exists,
optimum {tFB,p FB} is then given by the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC). ¥
32PROOF OF LEMMA 6. Evaluating the second derivative of U(t) at tS using f(tS)=1 /pr yields that
U00(tS)=
bprF00(tS)
(tS + p ¯ F(tS)r)2 +
2b(1 − prf(tS))
(tS + p ¯ F(tS)r)3 =
bprF00(tS)
(tS + p ¯ F(tS)r)2 < 0.
Because U(t) is strictly concave at any interior critical point, U(t) is strictly pseudoconcave (Avriel, Diewert,
Schaible & Zang (1988)) and thus tS is a unique global maximum. The boundary conditions follows from
that f is strictly monotone decreasing. ¥












(tD)3(ptDf(tD)+p ¯ F(tD) − 1)] =
bpF00(tD)
tD < 0.
Because U1(t) is strictly concave at any interior critical point, U1(t) is strictly pseudoconcave (Avriel et al.
(1988)) and thus tD is a unique global maximum. The boundary condition follows from that tf(t)+ ¯ F(t)
is strictly monotone decreasing and ¯ F(t)=1 . ¥









[p(tif(ti)+ ¯ F(ti))(1 + ρj(1 −
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)) + ρiρj − 1] = 0.
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The inequality follows from the fact that F00(·) < 0 and that (1 + ρj(1 − r
ˆ ti)) > 0. Because it is strictly
concave at any interior critical point, Ui(ti,t j) is strictly pseudoconcave in ti (Avriel et al. (1988)), implying
ˆ ti is a unique global maximum. ¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Let A(t,p)=
v−b− ¯ F(t)(pcI+(1−p)cE)−C(p)
t+p ¯ F(t)r and B(t,p)=t + p ¯ F(t)r.
From equation 4, f(tS) >f(tFB) implying tS(p) <t FB(p), therefore self routing cannot achieve ﬁrst best.
Claim: At any ﬁxed p, V FB is uniquely maximized at tFB.
∂V 2(tFB)
∂t2 =






33Since V (t) is strictly concave at any interior critical point, V (t) is strictly pseudoconcave (Avriel et al.
(1988)), and tFB(p) is a unique global maximum. Since the agents’ optimal eﬀort in dedicated and cross
routing only depend on p and are diﬀerent from the FOC of tFB, ﬁrst best cannot be implemented by these
two schemes. ¥
PROOF OF LEMMA 9. To show tS(p) <t D(p), substituting tS(p) into the FOC of tD(p) yields
that w
tS(p)[ptS(p)f(tS(p)) + p ¯ F(tS(p)) − 1] = w
tS(p)[
tS(p)
r + p ¯ F(tS(p) − 1] > 0. We show tD(p) <t C(p)
by contradiction. Suppose tD(p) ≥ tC(p) and it follows from the FOC of tD(p) that ptC(p)f(tC(p)) +
p ¯ F(tC(p)) − 1 ≥ 0. Then, p[tC(p)f(tC(p)) + ¯ F(tC(p))][1 + (1 − r




tC(p) (tC(p)+p ¯ F(tC(p)r −r) > 0, contradicting the FOC
of tC(p). The rest follows from that Q is strictly increasing in t at any p.¥
PROOF OF LEMMA 10. Because tS =a r g m i n
t0≥t
{t0 + p ¯ F(t0)r},w C(p)=a −
bC(p)
tC(p)+p ¯ F(tC(p))r =
wS(p)=a −
bS(p)
tS(p)+p ¯ F(tS(p))r implies that bC(p) >b S(p). Because wD(p)=
a[tD(p)+p ¯ F(tD(p))r]−bD(p)
2tD(p) ,
then zero wage rate implies bD(p)=a[tD(p)+p ¯ F(tD(p))r]. The inequality follows from Lemma 9. ¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. First we compare the principal’s proﬁtr a t ea ta n yp,




(tC(p)+p ¯ F(tC(p))r)(tS(p)+p ¯ F(tS(p))r)
+
(pcI +( 1− p)cE)(tC ¯ F(tS(p)) − tS ¯ F(tC(p)))
(tC(p)+p ¯ F(tC(p))r)(tS(p)+p ¯ F(tS(p))r)
.
(i) Since tC(p) >t S(p), it follows that
F(tC(p))−F(tS(p))
tC(p)−tS(p) <f(tS(p)) = 1
pr and tC ¯ F(tS(p)−tS ¯ F(tC(p) >
0. Therefore, V C(p)−V S(p) > 0 when pcI +(1−p)cE is large enough or when v−C(p) is small enough,
i.e., if cI or cE are suﬃciently large or if C(·) is suﬃciently convex. Hence, V C = V C(pC) >VC(pS) >
V S(pS)=V S. The ﬁrst inequality follows from the optimality of V C. (ii) V C(p) − V S(p) < 0 if v is
large enough. Hence, V C = V C(pC) <VS(pC) <V S(pS)=V S. The last inequality follows from the
optimality of V S. Comparing V D with V C and V S is similar and thus omitted. ¥
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N − 1 − ρj
] < 0.
The last equality follows from the FOC above and that
∂ρi
∂ti = − r
t2
i
p[tif(ti)+ ¯ F(ti)]. The inequality follows
from the fact that F00(·) < 0 and that ρj < 1. Because it is strictly concave at any interior critical point,
Ui(ti,t j) is strictly pseudoconcave in ti (Avriel et al. (1988)), implying ˆ ti is a unique global maximum.
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium gives the equation. ¥
PROOF OF LEMMA 12. If tD(p)=t, we are done because tC
N(p) is interior. Now consider interior
tD(p). Suppose to the contrary tD(p) ≥ tC




N)] ≥ 1 (for simplicity, we use tc
N to denote tC
N(p).) Let gN(t) denote the FOC of the symmetric



















contradicting the optimality condition of tC
N. ¥
PROOF OF LEMMA 13. To show tC
N ≥ tC
N+1, it suﬃces to show gN decreases in both N and t. For






pr ¯ F(t)(prf(t) − 1)
t
≤ 0
for any t ≥ tD becausef(t) ≤ f(tD) ≤ f(tS)=1 /pr. L e m m a1 2s h o w st h a ttD <t C
N for all N ≥ 2.




N)=0 . What is left to show is that gN decreases in t.
∂gN(t)
∂t




















35(b/c f(t) ≤ 1/pr and r ≤ t).S i n c e t h e ﬁrst two terms are negative, the third term being negative is a
suﬃcient condition for
∂gN(t)





t2f(t). Now let us invoke the DFR













¯ F(t) − 1) ≥ 0, then the third term of
∂gN(t)
∂t is negative. Satisfying the condition calls for the IGFR




¯ F(t) =1 .¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Let t∗
i denote the optimal eﬀort when all other agents choose tD.I t




−i) ≤ ε. Claim. t∗
i ≥ tD. To show this, substitute tD into the
equilibrium condition given all other agents choose tD. Because p[tDf(tD)+ ¯ F(tD)] = 1 (If tD = t,w e






tD] > 0. Because the agent’s
problem is strictly pseudoconcave as shown in Lemma 11, t∗




























































































































Now choose N2 large enough s.t. LHS ≤ ε. Let Nε =m a x ( N1,N 2). ¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. Since all the IR constraints bind, the principal’s problems under dedi-




g(tH)+p(1 − πH)g(r)+( 1− πH)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)+C(p)
The FOC is C0(ˆ p)=( 1−πH)(cE−cI−g(r)). Then, b =
g(tH)−g(tL)
(πH−πL)p and w = g(tH)+p(1−πH)g(r)−b.
The principal’s problem under self routing is equivalent to
min
0≤p≤1,w,b
g(tH)+p(1 − πH)g(r)+( 1− πH)(pcI +( 1− p)cE)+C(p)
s.t. p ≥ ¯ pS.
36Then w and b are determined by w = g(tH)+p(1 − πH)g(r) − b.If ¯ pS ≤ ˆ p, then CS = CC. If ¯ pS > ˆ p,
then CS >C C. This occurs when cI is suﬃciently large, when cE is suﬃciently small, or when C(·) is
suﬃciently convex, as evident from the FOC of ˆ p. ¥
37Online Appendix
Dependent Rework Time
We now relax the assumption that the rework time has a constant mean r.W el e tr depend on the
ﬁrst-pass eﬀort t, i.e., r = τ −t, where τ is a constant. In this subsection, we will delve directly into
the results without laying out the optimization problems of the principal and the agents. Note that
these problems are identical to the ones presented earlier except that the rework time r is replaced
with τ − t wherever appropriate. We summarize the agents’ optimal eﬀort in Table 2.
With ample capacity, we show that dedicated routing and cross routing can implement the
ﬁrst-best eﬀort and quality inspection precision and enables the principal to achieve the ﬁrst-best
proﬁt rate, while self routing cannot. With limited capacity, while the agents’ problems remain well
behaved, the comparison of the three rework routing schemes becomes analytically less tractable. To
verify that our main results presented earlier still hold with dependent rework time, we conducted
a numerical study. Our numerical results are consistent with the main results earlier. When the
gross margin is high, Figure 6 shows that there exists a threshold of cA below which self routing
leads to highest proﬁt rate. In contrast, when the gross margin is low, Figure 7 shows that cross
routing always dominates the other two routing schemes. These numerical ﬁndings are consistent
with results in Proposition 3.


























C) − p ¯ F(t
C)] = 0
Table 2: The agents’ optimal eﬀort under dependent rework time (assuming interior solutions)
38A: Effort  t B: Quality Inspection Precision p
C: Piece Rate b D: Profit Rate V
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Figure 6: Equilibrium performance depends on the appraisal cost: high gross margin (v = 10).F (t)=
1 − e−3(t−1),c I =0 .5,c E =1 0 ,C (p)=
cAp2
1−p , τ =2 ,a=0 .5,w=0 .
A: Effort  t B: Quality Inspection Precision p
C: Piece Rate b D: Profit Rate V

















































A: Effort  t B: Quality Inspection Precision p
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A: Effort  t B: Quality Inspection Precision p
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Figure 7: Equilibrium performance depends on the appraisal cost: low gross margin (v =4 ) .F (t)=
1 − e−3(t−1),c I =0 .5,c E =1 0 ,C (p)=
cAp2
1−p , τ =2 ,a=0 .5,w=0 .
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